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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Difficult economic circumstances have historically led Indonesian leaders 
to enact economic reforms, leading some to argue that bad times have 
resulted in good policy. But as Indonesian growth has slowed over the 
past year, the government has departed from this pattern, and is instead 
ratcheting up protectionist measures in the form of a variety of non-tariff 
barriers. These measures are likely to drive up prices for Indonesian 
consumers at a time when their purchasing power is declining, and 
undermine the competitiveness and productivity of Indonesian firms. 
A strong rupiah, anti-foreign sentiment, increased Chinese competition in 
the global supply chain, and the populist preferences of new Indonesian 
President Jokowi have all combined to push Indonesia toward 
protectionism. Despite the negative consequences for Indonesian 
consumers and firms, these measures are likely to continue under the 
Jokowi Administration. 
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Indonesia’s recent decision to cut the quota for live cattle imports from 
Australia has been seen by some as yet another example of how the 
relationship between Australia and Indonesia is ebbing ever lower. The 
truth is, however, the decision has less to do with how Indonesia sees 
Australia than it does with the changing character of trade policy in 
Indonesia. 
Indonesia’s attitude to trade and investment in recent years has been 
characterised as “sitting on the fence.”1 On the one hand, the country is 
an active member in the G20, APEC, and ASEAN. Such participation 
has in the past encouraged domestic policy reforms that ensured 
Indonesia benefited from greater economic integration with other 
countries. Since taking office in October 2014, President Joko Widodo’s 
government has taken advantage of the 2014 APEC summit in Beijing 
and the 2015 Asian–African Commemorative Conference in Jakarta to 
pitch Indonesian investment opportunities to the global investment 
community.   
On the other hand, there is a growing trend towards protectionism. Most 
of the policies reflective of this trend are non-tariff measures, as tariffs 
are already very low. The introduction of a more restrictive cap on certain 
sectors, the ban on raw mineral exports, and the provision of greater 
authority for ministers to issue intervention and monitoring policies are 
just a few examples. This trend began during the tenure of former 
president Yudhoyono but is continuing under President Joko Widodo 
(Jokowi).  
Economists have often characterised economic reform in Indonesia as a 
pattern that follows ‘Sadli’s Law’, where bad times lead to good policies.2 
Certainly it has been like that in the past. Plunging oil revenue in the 
1980s pushed the government to implement broad-based economic 
reforms that boosted industrial development in Indonesia. In the late 
1990s, Indonesia introduced another package of economic reforms as 
part of an IMF program to make its way out of the Asian financial crisis.  
But it is not clear that such a pattern will repeat itself in the near future. 
The economy is now facing declining investment, diminished job 
creation, and a fiscal shortfall, owing to lower prices of natural resources 
commodities and lower demand from China for Indonesia’s exports. But 
the policies the government is pursuing in response to these are heavily 
protectionist in nature. This time, bad times are resulting in bad policy. 
This Analysis will outline Indonesia’s drift towards more protectionist 
economic policy and explore some of the key reasons it is occurring. 
 
 
…the policies the 
government is 
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INDONESIA’S PATTERN OF REFORM  
Like other economies, Indonesia is not immune from the cycle of boom 
and bust. Figure 1 shows GDP per capita on a Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) basis of Indonesia relative to the United States from 1960 to 2011, 
based on the Penn World Table. It underlines that the timing of major 
economic reforms in Indonesia have typically coincided with major 
economic crises. It also presents examples of protectionist policies 
implemented mostly during economic upturns.  
                      Figure 1. Indonesia’s income evolution and timing of key economic reforms 
 
Source: Adapted from Basri, Rahardja, and Fitrania.3 
 
The ‘command socialism’ of the late 1950s and early 1960s had 
collapsed by the middle of the 1960s, replaced by the dramatic reforms 
of the New Order. The 1967 Investment Law opened oil, the consumer 
sector, and heavy industries to foreign direct investment (FDI), which 
had previously been banned. Along with sharp increases in global 
energy and mineral prices in the 1970s and 1980s, the FDI reforms 
brought oil and mining multinationals to Indonesia, adding to the large 
influx of natural resources revenue.4 
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Reforms in the 1980s were triggered in large part by the collapse in 
global oil prices. The resulting contraction in the oil sector contributed to 
a slowing in the Indonesian economy. The government used the 
opportunity to launch a series of successful reform packages (paket 
reformasi) starting in 1983 and continuing into the early 1990s to 
stimulate non-oil industries, particularly those that were labour intensive. 
The economic reforms included measures to improve the mechanism for 
import fee refunds while encouraging exports; developing the capital 
market and banking sector; improving customs clearance procedures; 
reducing investment permit requirements; and relaxing ownership 
restrictions on foreign direct investment. These reforms helped 
accelerate economic growth and ushered in a new golden era for 
Indonesia.  
In 1992, Indonesia strongly supported an ASEAN free trade area, and in 
1994, Indonesia promoted the Bogor Declaration at APEC, which paved 
the way for greater regional economic integration. These reforms raised 
the productivity of Indonesia’s manufacturing sector, as firms could now 
access inputs at prices closer to international levels.5  
Unfortunately, the good economic times also attracted the attention of 
crony capitalists. Permits to perform economic activities (for example, 
automotive assembly, flour milling, forestry, cement production, 
petrochemicals, and clove trading) were given to certain business 
groups and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) without sufficient oversight 
or transparency. Several government projects, most notably in 
construction, were given to companies linked to President Suharto’s 
family.6 Combined with a lack of supervision in the banking sector and 
an underdeveloped capital market, these policies contributed to bad 
investments by local companies that eventually brought down the 
banking sector and the economy more broadly in 1997 and 1998.7 
As part of the economic rescue package agreement with the IMF 
following the crisis of 1998, Indonesia stripped the privileges of certain 
business groups and SOEs. Many import licences were abolished, and 
others simplified. Most notable was the removal of the authority of the 
national food agency, Bulog, to control imports of strategic food 
commodities such as rice and soybean. Between 2001 and 2002, rice 
trading was done largely by the private sector. Import tariffs were further 
reduced, bringing down the overall effective rate of protection. But the 
push for change in policy-making went much further when Indonesia 
decided to give significant budget planning and execution authority to 
district governments.  
On the international front, Indonesia supported the establishment of the 
free trade agreement (FTA) between ASEAN countries and China in 
2002 — a commitment that faced much domestic resistance after its 
implementation in 2010. Indonesia also negotiated and signed an FTA 
with Japan in 2008, the first bilateral FTA between Indonesia and its 
Unfortunately, the good 
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most important trading partner. The government’s interest in free trade 
after the IMF reforms was short-lived, however. It resumed tight control 
over the import of rice and reinstated its mandate to procure paddy rice 
from farmers. Trade in agriculture products became subject to 
discretionary permits (letters of recommendation) or implicit quotas that 
were prone to corruption.8  
The return to protectionism continued during the second term of the 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono presidency, following the 2008 and 2009 
global financial crisis. During this period, the government and the 
parliament passed new laws on mining, farming, and horticulture that 
had a serious impact on openness to trade and investment. 
Protectionism reached new heights after the Cabinet shake-up in 2012. 
The Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Industry added new 
products to the list of those that require permits. The Ministry of Trade 
reinstated import licensing on a number of products and imposed tighter 
control over the distribution of imported goods. Meanwhile, dialogues on 
bilateral FTAs, such as with Australia, the European Union, and South 
Korea, were put on hold. In 2013, the government imposed a ban on 
exports of raw minerals to comply with the Mining Law and to promote 
domestic processing. 
BAD TIMES AND BAD POLICY 
The administration of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) is continuing the 
trend towards greater protectionism. It is preparing increased local 
content requirements for telecommunication equipment (for example, 
smartphones and handheld devices) and for automotive parts. The 
Ministry of Trade has recently restricted retail sales of alcoholic 
beverages, while a draft law to completely ban alcohol consumption is 
being proposed to the Parliament.9 The Ministry of Manpower also 
imposed tighter control on the use of foreign professionals in 
Indonesia.10 Cabinet members talk openly about pushing back against 
the implementation of ASEAN Economic Community reforms and 
reviewing the usefulness of existing trade agreements.  
As Table 1 shows, protection in Indonesia in terms of tariffs has 
decreased over time. While there has been a slight increase in the 
simple average tariff since 2011, and the Jokowi Administration has 
recently announced a further increase in tariffs affecting consumer 
goods, the weighted average tariff (taking trade volumes into account) 
has dropped below 5 per cent. However, tariff measures give only a 
partial picture of the level of protection. Marks and Rahardja calculated 
the actual level of trade protection in Indonesia using nominal and 
effective rates of protection (NRP and ERP).11 They find that both 
measures increased between 1995 and 2008; for example, in the case 
of food crops, NRP and ERP increased from 11–17 per cent to 16–24 
per cent. The fact that tariffs have decreased around the same period 
implies that non-tariff measures have increased. 
…the government and 
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Table 1. Indonesia’s most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs, 1995–2013 
 
Tariff year Simple average 
(%) 
Weighted average 
(%) 
Standard deviation
1995 15.34 10.89 14.89 
1996 12.35 7.73 16.70 
1999 11.19 6.05 16.61 
2000 8.43 5.16 11.91 
2001 6.89 4.31 11.29 
2002 6.90 5.79 11.14 
2003 6.90 5.22 11.13 
2004 6.95 6.09 15.41 
2005 6.96 6.07 15.41 
2006 6.95 6.07 15.41 
2007 6.91 5.01 12.62 
2009 6.80 4.96 12.42 
2010 6.70 5.19 7.00 
2011 7.41 4.75 11.4 
2013 7.23 4.67 11.4 
 
Source: World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data. 
 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Central to the proliferation of non-tariff measures in Indonesia in recent 
years has been a raft of new trade- and investment-related regulations. 
Appendix 1 highlights some recently passed laws and explains their 
impact. Most of these laws and their accompanying regulations are 
intended to restrict export or import, stabilise domestic prices, and foster 
linkages in the domestic economy. The ‘linkage’ policy (also known as 
‘downstreaming’) was popular when developing countries were isolated 
from the rest of the global economy but it has been gaining popularity 
again, including in Indonesia. It is a type of industrial policy that aims to 
increase domestic value added by supporting an economic sector whose 
outputs are used heavily by another sector domestically, or which uses 
significant inputs from another domestic sector.12 In today's globalised 
world, however, such an approach is no longer workable. In fact, as 
linkages between economic sectors weaken, export earnings as well as 
employment creation may actually increase. Enforcing artificial linkages 
might therefore reallocate resources at the cost of existing industries and 
potential industries.13  
The new regulations also send contradictory messages. Take for 
example the Negative Investment List. The most recent list reduces 
foreign investment restrictions, allowing as much as 51 per cent foreign 
investment in advertising (previously 0 per cent) and 85 per cent in 
pharmaceutical manufacturing (previously 75 per cent). But at the same 
time, the list increases foreign ownership restriction in other areas, such 
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as distribution (previously no restrictions, now 33 per cent) in an attempt 
to protect local producers. 
Some of these new national regulations also conflict with local by-laws. 
For example, in the case of the sale of alcoholic beverages, the governor 
of Jakarta ruled that alcoholic beverages type A (0–5 per cent alcohol 
content) can be sold in minimarkets. But the minister of Trade issued a 
contradictory regulation, prohibiting all alcoholic beverages from being 
sold in minimarkets.14 Another example is local by-laws on imports. 
Import policy comes under central government authority. However, there 
are regional governments like that of the Brebes district and East Java 
province that issue regulations requiring their permission for imports to 
enter their respective jurisdictions.15   
NON-TARIFF MEASURES  
Although Indonesia may not be the worst offender in the region in 
imposing new trade-restrictive regulations, it is one of the worst when it 
comes to non-tariff measures. According to the Global Trade Alert (GTA) 
database, since 2009 Indonesia has implemented 25 non-tariff 
measures, compared with 12 by India and 1 by Thailand. Compared with 
China, Malaysia, India, and Thailand, Indonesia also issued more export 
taxes and restrictions.  
The GTA classifies trade measures as ‘green’, ‘amber’, and ‘red’ to 
indicate their degree of ‘harmfulness’, with red being the most harmful. 
Table 2 presents the number of harmful measures (‘amber’ and ‘red’) 
implemented by Indonesia, as compared with China, Malaysia, Thailand, 
and India.  
In its sixteenth report, the GTA listed Indonesia among the worst 
“offenders” for increasing protection since the global financial crisis.16 
According to its database, Indonesia has introduced 37 amber measures 
and 158 red measures since 2009. Furthermore, there are 746 tariff 
lines, 45 sectors, and 181 trading partners affected by the red measures.  
Appendix 2 lists some non-tariff measures imposed by Indonesia since 
2009, mostly by the minister of Trade. These include measures such as 
licence and permit requirements, pre-shipment inspections, and new 
labelling requirements. Some measures re-enforce previous ones, with 
increased strictness. Others include complicated cross-bureaucracy 
between ministries.  
Appendix 3 lists other measures Indonesia has used to promote 
domestic industries, including local content requirements and export 
restrictions.17 Export restrictions are also intended to ensure a sufficient 
domestic supply. These measures are sometimes taken in tandem, 
making the business environment more complicated and cumbersome. 
 
Although Indonesia may 
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Table 2. ‘Harmful’ trade measures  
Number of harmful measures implemented by 
specified jurisdiction, by type of measure 
Total measures 
Indonesia China  Malaysia Thailand India 
Bail-out / state aid measure 6 6 1 1 19 
Competitive devaluation 0 0 0 0 0 
Consumption subsidy 0 1 0 0 0 
Export subsidy 3 11 2 1 25 
Export taxes or restriction 18 10 1 2 14 
Import ban 6 3 1 0 6 
Import subsidy 0 0 1 1 2 
Intellectual property protection 0 2 0 0 0 
Investment measure 13 17 4  3 12 
Local content requirement 15 9 4 0 107 
Migration measure 2 1 2 1 2 
Non-tariff barrier (not otherwise specified) 25 9 3 1 12 
Other service-sector measure 4 3 0 0 1 
Public procurement 9 7 0 0 13 
Quota (including tariff-rate quotas) 5 7 0 0 2 
Sanitary and phytosanitary measure 4 0 0 0 0 
State trading enterprise 0 0 0 0 0 
State-controlled company 2 1 0 0 1 
Sub-national government measure 0 2 0 0 1 
Tariff measure 12 15 3 1 37 
Technical barrier to trade 3 1 0 0 0 
Trade defence measure (anti-dumping, 
countervailing duties, safeguard) 
17 45 7 14 135 
Trade finance 1 1 2 0 95 
Total 115 131 18 22 356 
Source: http://www.globaltradealert.org, accessed 13 May 2015. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE 
PROTECTIONISM 
A number of factors have played a role in the re-emergence of 
protectionism in Indonesia. One of these has been exchange rate 
movements. Exchange rate movements often drive protectionist 
tendencies.18 When the real exchange rate appreciates, export becomes 
more expensive. To compensate for reduced demand, the sectors that 
produce traded goods often ask government for protection in the form of 
tariff- or non-tariff measures.19 In part this seems to explain, for example, 
the rise in protectionist measures around the local rice industry.  
Nevertheless, movements in the exchange rate do not on their own 
explain why the government often protects a small group of businesses 
at the cost of the rest of the population. The answer often lies in the 
ability of small concentrated interests like rice traders to lobby more 
effectively than the larger population. Corruption also plays a role in this 
regard.  
Four more recent factors also help to explain the re-emergence of 
protectionism in Indonesia. First, a drop in Indonesia’s competitiveness. 
Figure 2 depicts Indonesia’s competitiveness as represented by the real 
effective exchange rate.20 There was a strong appreciation after the 
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Asian financial crisis of 1998 before it reversed in 2013. The appreciation 
was due to a commodity boom, as more than half of Indonesia’s non-oil 
and gas exports were contributed by commodities. Indeed, the value of 
Indonesia’s exports nearly tripled during the period between 2004 and 
2011, from $US71 billion to $US201 billion. But this was mainly due to 
the significant increase in the price of commodity exports, rather than in 
the quantity. As the boom ended, Indonesia’s competitiveness also 
dropped.  
Figure 2. Indonesia’s trade competitiveness 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from BIS database, http://www.bis.org/stats. 
 
At the same time, like in other countries, Indonesia’s manufacturing 
sector came under threat with China’s accession to the WTO. China’s 
entrance into the global trading system quickly changed the competitive 
equation for Indonesia, as it competes directly with China on labour-
intensive products such as footwear, garments, and other light 
manufacturing. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s aspiration to move up the value 
chain in manufacturing and to develop heavy industries was immediately 
challenged by the rapid expansion of Chinese exports in the global 
marketplace. This and the commodity boom meant that Indonesia’s 
manufacturing exports, especially labour-intensive products such as 
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textiles, clothing, and footwear (TCF), and leather products and furniture 
(Figure 3), comprised a declining share of its total exports. Finally, 
changes in wages and increased uncertainty in the regulatory 
environment after the Asian crisis weakened the link between output 
growth and jobs generated in manufacturing, and reduced the likelihood 
of medium-size firms expanding.21  
Figure 3. Share of Indonesia’s exports by major products 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from UN-COMTRADE based on SITC rev 2. 
 
The second factor in the re-emergence of protectionism in Indonesia is 
related to the trauma of Indonesia’s experience with the IMF in the wake 
of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. Many observers (for example, Ito 
2004 and Grenville 2004) have demonstrated that the IMF’s economic 
prescriptions for Indonesia were misplaced and did damage to the 
Indonesian economy. One consequence of this was that it created an 
‘IMF stigma’.22 There remains today in Indonesia a strong sentiment “to 
avoid even thinking about asking financial assistance from the IMF.”23 
But this sentiment is not just anti-IMF: populist commentators portray 
increased FDI and financing by international financial institutions as 
signs that Indonesia is once again bowing to the demands of foreigners 
instead of its own people.24 Such stereotypes were reinforced by 
Indonesia’s strong performance during the global financial crisis of 
2008–09. Many argued that Indonesia escaped the worst of the crisis 
 TRADE PROTECTIONISM IN INDONESIA: BAD TIMES AND BAD POLICY 
 
11
 
because it was more domestically oriented, and less engaged in foreign 
trade. Partly as a consequence, an inward-looking economic strategy is 
once again gaining appeal.25  
The anti-foreign attitude also helps explain why Indonesia has been less 
enthusiastic about the global production network. The data on ‘trade in 
value added’ from the OECD reveals that the share of foreign value 
added in Indonesia’s exports has declined from 30 per cent in 2005 to 19 
per cent in 2011 (Figure 4).26 This is in contrast to other successful 
manufacturing exporters in the region, which have increased the foreign 
value added component of their exports. One reason for this is that 
Indonesia’s exports were increasingly dominated by commodities and 
natural resources. Another reason was the measures introduced by 
Indonesia that discriminate against imports. Rather than seeing this as a 
matter of concern, the nationalist policy-makers and populist 
commentators celebrate the fact. They portray higher foreign content in 
export or domestic production as a sign of weakness. Such a view is, 
however, short-sighted. It is precisely participation in global or regional 
production networks that has been a key factor in driving exports and 
investments in manufacturing in neighbouring countries.  
 
Figure 4. Indonesia’s declining import content in exports: is this a good sign? 
 
Source: OECD TiVa database, http://stats.oecd.org, accessed 11 June 2015. 
 
The third factor relates to the character of the new president, Jokowi. As 
the mayor of the city of Solo, Central Java, Jokowi was a success.27 He 
came from a business background, so he understood the challenges 
faced by the private sector. He adopted an unusual approach to 
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improving the investment climate in Solo. This included his famous 
impromptu visits to local merchants, traders, and other business players. 
He relied on ad hoc policies, often drafted after talks with business-
people and meetings in the field. But he was successful, and given 
numerous awards. 
He then became the governor of Jakarta. During his short, two-year 
governorship, he tried to implement the same approach he had applied 
in Solo. With its very large population (10 million, compared with Solo’s 
half a million) he faced far bigger challenges in Jakarta than he had in 
Solo. Nevertheless, he emerged as the ‘people’s favourite leader’, and 
not just in Solo and Jakarta; he became popular elsewhere too.  
Given his previous experience, especially in Solo, some may have 
expected that Jokowi would pursue market-friendly economic policies. 
However, to date, he has pursued more interventionist policies. Such an 
approach might arguably be the result of Jokowi’s promise during the 
election days to be more supportive to domestic industries’ needs. For 
example, during the campaign, Jokowi famously promised to achieve 
self-sufficiency in beef within a few years; in July 2015 his administration 
cut the quota for imports of Australian live cattle by 80 per cent. 
The fourth factor has been the use of active industrial policies in many 
emerging East Asian countries, which may have prompted Indonesia to 
follow suit.28 The state-supported domestic firms that helped China to 
become “leading dragon” and Taiwan to become a major innovator in 
electronics in the region are just a few examples of these policies.29 The 
new Indonesian government has signalled its willingness to support 
domestic private investment in sectors deemed to be strategic priorities.  
Once again, pursuing protectionist policies is likely to prove counter-
productive.  Given that the Indonesian economy is still suffering from 
other chronic deficiencies, including its poor energy infrastructure, its 
poor logistics, its underdeveloped services sector, and deficiencies in the 
predictability of economic rules and regulations, protectionism is unlikely 
to significantly improve the ability of domestic industries to compete in 
the global marketplace. On the contrary, excessive protectionism, 
through the creation of barriers to trade and FDI, can further undermine 
the competitiveness and productivity of Indonesian firms, as such 
measures limit access to inputs and technology.30  
POLICY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Looking ahead, there are few indications that President Jokowi is going 
to abandon the protectionist trend in Indonesian economic policy. In 
January 2015, the President signed into law his national medium-term 
development program (RPJMN). The trade section in the RPJMN is very 
broad and deals with both domestic trade and foreign trade. The 
domestic trade policy aims are ambitious. Among other things it seeks 
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to: cut logistics costs from 24 per cent of GDP in 2015 to 19 per cent in 
2019; cut average dwelling time at the ports from five to six days in 2015 
to three to four days in 2019; increase the growth rate of the retail and 
wholesale trade sectors in GDP from 5 per cent in 2015 to 8 per cent in 
2019; keep the coefficient of variation of the prices of “essential”31 goods 
across regions from a maximum of 14 per cent in 2015 to a maximum of 
13 per cent in 2019; and revitalise 1000 ‘people’s markets’ every year. 
The section on foreign trade aims to: increase the growth rate of non-oil 
exports from 8 per cent in 2015 to 14 per cent in 2019; increase service 
exports from 2.7 per cent of GDP in 2015 to 3.5 per cent of GDP in 
2019; and increase the share of manufacturing in total exports from 44 
per cent in 2015 to 65 per cent in 2019. 
Domestic trade strategies, as stipulated by the planning document, focus 
on the improvement of infrastructure and logistics and on the increase of 
economic activities and efficiency of cross-regional trade in Indonesia. 
Foreign trade strategies, on the other hand, include linkage policy, trade 
facilitation, and the re-evaluation of existing free trade agreements. 
Considering the existing regulatory framework, policies, and the level of 
protection in Indonesia, these goals will be difficult to meet.  
Although promoting domestic industry is well intentioned, relying only on 
protectionist policy may lead to industries that are forced to rely heavily 
on the domestic market. Indonesia’s market is the largest in Southeast 
Asia; however, limiting industry only to domestic growth risks missing the 
benefits of being part of global production chains. Using quarterly data 
since 2000, we studied the relationship between the share of 
manufacturing in total exports, the share of FDI in the manufacturing 
sector, and the real effective exchange rate.32 FDI was included because 
net FDI inflow to Indonesia continues to increase, and there is a strong 
assumption that foreign investment has been playing a key role in driving 
Indonesia’s manufacturing exports.33 The results suggest that the 
manufacturing share of total exports has not responded to increased FDI 
in manufacturing, and vice versa.34 This supports the argument that in 
recent years the manufacturing industry in Indonesia has become more 
inward-oriented.  
Another cause of concern is that interventionist policy may lead to a 
wasteful allocation of resources. Governments often subsidise the 
private sector’s inputs or investments even when the private sector itself 
is willing to spend at the prevailing market rate and risk. This might lead 
to overinvestment by the government or poor spending decisions by the 
private sector which could be more productive for other purposes.35 In 
such situations, firms would have less incentive to push for greater 
efficiency and, on the contrary, will likely continue asking for government 
support. Indonesia should know this well because this type of protection 
has led to cronyism and bad investments decisions in the past. 
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These more protectionist policies also risk Indonesia’s leadership 
position in ASEAN and its involvement in the World Trade Organization 
and the G20. Indonesia has struggled to maintain a good posture in 
these forums, as a member of and a leader in an integrating world. 
Inward-looking policies run counter to this objective. 
CONCLUSION 
Protectionism is still on the rise in Indonesia, mostly in the form of non-
tariff measures. These are accompanied by policies typical of a 
developmentalist state, such as indiscriminate measures to increase 
domestic processing, despite the fact that global production networks 
increasingly shape every country’s trade with the world. 
Declining commodity prices, prolonged sluggish growth in the global 
economy, and tough competition with other low-cost producers are likely 
to add pressure on Indonesia to introduce interventionist policies. In 
addition, past reforms that have lowered tariffs and increased FDI might 
have further pressured the government to support domestic 
entrepreneurs to develop industries. While state intervention through 
public support for industrialisation is not uncommon in East Asia, the 
worry for Indonesia is that it will repeat the mistakes it has made before: 
prolonging protection and life support for industries that are not 
economically viable. 
Increasing protectionism is likely to prove immensely counterproductive 
for the Indonesian economy. Rather than pursuing interventionist 
policies the Indonesian government needs to return to the basics: 
infrastructure, logistics, and consistency of rules and regulations. 
Unfortunately, for the immediate future, that seems very unlikely.   
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APPENDIX 1. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE TRADE-RELATED 
LAWS 
Law 4/2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining 
This law replaced Law 11/1967 on Basic Mining Provision. The main 
new feature is the forbidding of the export of unprocessed minerals and 
coal within five years of the law’s inception (hence by 2014). The 
minerals include bauxite, nickel ore, and copper ore, as well as tin, 
chromium, gold, and silver. According to Howes and Davies (2014), this 
restriction affects about $US5.5–6 billion of Indonesia’s exports — or 
about 3 per cent of the total in 2014. The export ban is intended to oblige 
miners to process and refine their minerals domestically. This law has 
been very controversial, as many big miners with a long history in 
Indonesia claim it is uneconomical to build their own smelters, while the 
smaller miners lack the funds to do so.  
Different ministries issued different implementing regulations. For 
example, the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation 
1/2014 stipulates that miners have to build their own smelters and 
refineries so as to increase domestic value added of mining products. 
The Minister of Trade Regulation 4/2014 rules that only mining products 
that have reached a certain threshold of domestic processing are 
allowed for exports. The Minister of Finance 153/2014 is the least 
interventionist among these regulations, as it offers some ‘price 
mechanisms’ to ‘incentivise’ miners to build refineries and smelters in 
Indonesia. According to this regulation, the government will impose a 7.5 
per cent export tariff if construction (of smelters) reaches 7.5 per cent 
completion, a 5 per cent export tariff if progress is between 7.5 per cent 
and 30 per cent, and 0 per cent when construction is 30 per cent 
complete or above by January 2017. 
Law 13/2010 on Horticulture 
According to this law, every person engaging in horticulture business 
should prioritise domestic goods and services (Article 71). Export of 
horticultural products is allowed after fulfilling the needs of national 
consumption (Article 87). On the other hand, import of horticulture 
products is allowed if permitted by the minister of Trade under 
recommendation from the minister of Agriculture (Article 88), but only via 
designated points of entry (Article 33). The process to import is 
particularly cumbersome, as in order to get a recommendation from the 
minister of Agriculture, an approval from a provincial office is required 
(which in turn requires a regency or municipal’s recommendation). 
This law was the basis of the five-year ‘blueprint’ of the Ministry of 
Agriculture for 2010–14 which, among other things, targets self-
sufficiency in five commodities: rice, sugar, soybean, beef, and corn. 
Indonesia failed to reach this target for most of these, yet carried the aim 
forward in the next period’s blueprint. Due to its highly protectionist 
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approach, objections to this law were lodged by the European Union, the 
United States, and New Zealand.  
Law 18/2012 on Food 
This law authorises the government to regulate trade in food through 
price and quantity stabilisation, food reserves management, and the 
development of a good investment climate for the food business (Article 
51). The government is obliged to stabilise the supply and the price of 
staple foods at both the producer and consumer levels. Such 
stabilisation is intended to protect “the income and purchasing power of 
farmers, fishermen, small and micro food enterprises, as well as 
consumers’ welfare” (Article 55).  
Furthermore, the law stipulates that food sources should come from 
domestic food production and national food reserves. Imports are 
allowed only if these supplies are insufficient (Article 14 and Article 36). 
Therefore, the government should prioritise domestic food production in 
meeting domestic demand (Article 15). The export of staple food is 
allowed only after domestic needs and national food reserves are 
fulfilled.  
Law 19/2013 on Protection and Empowerment of Farmers 
This law lays out strategies to protect farmers (Article 7). These include 
the “elimination of the practice of high-cost economy.” The elucidation 
explains vaguely that this “is intended to ensure the implementation of 
farming activity in an effective and efficient manner.” 
Furthermore, the government is obliged to prioritise domestic agriculture 
products to meet domestic needs. This is to be done through import 
regulations (Article 15). Every person is also prohibited from importing 
agriculture commodities when the domestic supply is “sufficient” (Article 
30), as stipulated by the minister of Agriculture. The case of rice 
illustrates why implementing these articles can be very inconsistent. 
Even when the government itself has stated that domestic supply is not 
enough, the import of rice has still been banned.36 
The government is also obliged to create conditions that lead to 
favourable agriculture commodity prices for farmers by stipulating duty 
tariffs, points of entry designation, quality standards, and price 
stabilisation policy (Article 25).  
These interventionist stances extend to marketing. In particular, every 
person who manages a modern store (as opposed to traditional market) 
is obliged to prioritise sales of domestic agriculture commodities (Article 
50). 
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Law 3/2014 on Industry 
This law takes an interventionist approach to promote industry, and 
shows the government’s belief in a linkages policy that forces the 
creation of domestic value added chains and discourages the use of 
imported inputs in production. Article 31, for example, states that in order 
to increase value added to natural resources, the government will 
promote domestic processing industries. Article 32 is similar: in order to 
increase industry value added, the government may restrict the export of 
natural resources. Article 33 continues, stating that central and local 
governments are to ensure the availability and distribution of natural 
resources for domestic industries. Finally, Article 85 says that to 
empower domestic industries, the government will increase the use of 
domestic products or components. In the elucidation of this article, it is 
stated that the export of raw materials is allowed only if the needs of 
domestic industries have been met. 
Law 7/2014 on Trade 
Two features of this law stand out: its mercantile tone and its anti-
consumer stance. Firstly, there is an inherent phobia towards imports 
that is evident in the law’s approach to the problem of trade balance. 
Article 54 states that the government may restrict the import of goods to 
maintain the balance of trade.37 This implies a perception that the 
problem of trade is more about imports than exports. The latter is subject 
to restriction, however, when the domestic supply is deemed insufficient 
or when the government is determined to increase the domestic value 
added (Article 54). 
Secondly, there is strong bias towards producers and against 
consumers in the foreign trade part of the law. Article 70 states that if the 
price of an imported good is lower than the “normal price” and causes a 
loss or potential loss to relevant domestic manufacturers, the 
government is obliged to take anti-dumping measures. While this 
practice is allowed by the WTO, it requires strong evidence as well as 
effective consultation. The article is also rather confusing, as there is no 
explanation of what “normal price” means. 
Law 20/2014 on Standardisation and Conformity Assessment 
This law is to support the implementation of the Indonesian National 
Standard (SNI). This includes technical regulations, certifications, and 
laboratory testing procedures, which are imposed on industries in 
addition to the existing international standards enforced by regulatory 
agencies. While the objective is to ensure conformity of products with a 
nationally recognised standard, in practise it may add unnecessary costs 
for the producers and deprive local consumers of cheaper, imported 
goods. By January 2015, more than 10 000 SNIs have been developed, 
270 of which are mandatory.  
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APPENDIX 2. SELECTED LIST OF NON-TARIFF 
MEASURES IMPOSED BY INDONESIA SINCE 2009 
Date of issuance Name Nature of restriction Notes/highlights 
18/02/2009 MOT 
Regulation 
8/2009 
New procedures for 
the import of steel and 
iron products. 
 
19/11/2009 MOT 
Regulation 
27/2009 
Stricter regulation on 
fruit and vegetable 
imports. 
Certification letters 
that products do not 
contain dangerous 
chemicals as 
regulated by FAO. 
26/01/2010 MOT 
Regulation 
2/2010 
Verification of foreign 
raw materials in 
textiles.  
Textiles produced in 
Bonded Zones made 
completely out of 
Indonesian raw 
materials exempted 
from technical 
inspection. 
15/03/2010 MOT 
Regulation 
11/2010 
Tighter regulation on 
the import of 
machines, tools, and 
ingredients for disc 
production. 
Importer needs a 
special licence as 
Registered Importers 
of Optic Discs, 
renewable every 4 
years. 
13/12/2011 MOT 
Regulation 
40/2011 
Pre-shipment 
inspection requirement 
on tyre imports. 
 
29/12/2011 MOT 
Regulation 
48/2011 
Import regulation for 
used capital goods. 
Every importation 
must obtain approval 
from MOT, with 
recommendation from 
MOI. No imports 
allowed for used 
goods older than 20 
years. 
6/02/2012 MOA 
Regulation 
5/2012 
Import provisions on 
seeds. 
Each importer must 
obtain permission 
from MOA, then 
import has to be 
concluded within 2 
years. 
21/11/2012 MOT 
Regulation 
59/2012 
Restriction for 
importers of more than 
one product group. 
Each importer must 
have importer 
identification number 
(API) for each good in 
different classification 
system, e.g. a car 
component importer 
has to obtain different 
APIs for seats and 
windows. 
27/12/2012 MOT 
Regulation 
82/2012 
Stricter import 
regulation on mobile 
phones and tablets. 
Intended to support 
the industrialisation in 
mobile phones and 
computers in the 
future. 
29/12/2012 MOT 
Regulation 
83/2012 
Imposition of additional 
requirements for 
imports of certain 
products. 
Requirements include 
licences, pre-
shipment inspection, 
and limited access to 
seaports and airports. 
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28/05/2013 BPOM 
Regulation 
27/2013 and 
28/2013 
Supervision of the 
importation of drug 
ingredients, traditional 
drug ingredients, 
health supplement 
ingredients, and food 
materials. 
Importers should 
obtain a distribution 
license and import 
statement letter. 
28/08/2013 MOA 
Regulation 
84/2013 
Import restriction on 
carcass, meat, offal, 
and/or their 
derivatives. 
Reference price 
system. Labelling 
imposed. 
30/08/2013 MOT 
Regulation 
46/2013 
Import restriction for 
meat, offal, and 
processed meat. 
Reference price 
system. Labelling 
imposed. Import 
volumes are 
determined for each 
import permit 
individually. 
28/03/2014 MOT 
Regulation 
19/2014 
Import and export 
provision of rice. 
Import is allowed only: 
1) for rice with 25 per 
cent broken quality, 2) 
conducted by Bulog 
(national logistics 
agency), 3) outside 
the period 1 month 
before to 2 months 
after harvest season. 
11/04/2014 MOT 
Regulation 
20/2014 
Controlling and 
monitoring of alcoholic 
beverages. 
Additional 
certification: 
registered importer of 
alcoholic beverages 
(ITMB, renewable 
every 3 years), in 
addition to business 
permit (SIUP), 
company registration 
letter (TDP), custom 
identity number (NIK), 
importer identity 
number (AIP), and 
import permit. Also 
required: copies of 
contracts with at least 
20 manufacturing 
companies from at 
least 5 different 
countries of at least 
3000 cartons per 
brand per year, 
certified by public 
notary or trade 
attaché in the 
respective countries. 
2/06/2014 MOT Decree 
28/2014 
Restriction on import 
licensing for steel 
alloy. 
 
24/06/2013 MOT 
Regulation 
29/2013 
Restriction for exports 
of crude palm oil and 
its derivatives. 
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17/09/2014 MOT 
Regulation 
56/2014 
Local content 
requirements for 
traditional markets, 
modern stores, and 
shopping centres. 
Local content at least 
80 per cent of goods 
sold. Exempted if: 1) 
requiring uniformity 
from a global supply 
chain, 2) having a 
brand that is world 
famous and yet to 
have a production 
base in Indonesia, 
and 3) products from 
certain countries 
being sold to meet the 
needs of their citizens 
living in Indonesia. 
26/11/2013 MOT 
Regulation 
67/2013 
Requirement that all 
imported goods be 
labelled in Indonesian 
language. 
 
15/07/2014 MOT 
Regulation 
39/2014 
Export restriction for 
coal and coal-linked 
products. 
Producers should 
register with MOT 
before being allowed 
to export for 3 years, 
then they should 
apply for extension. 
14/10/2014 Government 
Regulation 
76/2014 
Public procurement in 
defence industry. 
 
24/12/2014 MOT 
Regulation 
97/2014 
Export restriction for 
industrial forestry 
products. 
 
16/01/2015 MOT 
Regulation 
6/2015 
Restriction on the sale 
of alcoholic beverages. 
No alcohol allowed for 
sale in minimarkets — 
only in supermarkets 
and hypermarkets, 
with required permits. 
    
Notes: MOT, MOA, MOI, BPOM are Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of 
Industry, Food and Drug Monitoring Agency. Source: GTA, accessed 13 May 2015. 
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APPENDIX 3. SELECTED LIST OF LOCAL CONTENT 
REQUIREMENT MEASURES TAKEN BY INDONESIA 
SINCE 2009 
Date of issuance Name Nature of restriction Notes/highlights 
16/11/2009 MOF 
Regulation 
176/2009 
Import tariff exempts for 
inputs to locally 
produced machinery. 
 
19/04/2010 MOI 
Regulation 
48/2010 
Local content 
requirements for power 
plants. 
 
14/12/2012 MOI 
Regulation 
15/2012 
Increased local content 
requirements in textiles, 
clothing, and footwear 
industry. 
 
21/05/2012 MOF 
Regulation 
76/2012 
Local content promotion 
scheme via input tariffs 
on goods, machinery, 
and materials used in 
the assembly of 
motorised vehicles. 
At least 30 per cent of 
total value of machines 
used must have been 
locally produced. 
5/10/2012 Law 
16/2012 
Local content 
requirements in defence 
industry. 
 
15/10/2012 Government 
Regulation 
82/2012 
Local content 
requirements for 
electronic system 
operator in public 
services. 
Required to establish 
data centre in 
Indonesia. 
29/10/2012 MOT 
Regulation 
68/2012 
Strict regulation in 
franchising in retail 
business. 
Locally produced 
goods should take at 
least 80 per cent of 
goods being sold. 
11/02/2012 MOT 
Regulation 
7/2013 
Local content 
requirements in food 
and beverages industry. 
 
22/02/2013 MOEMR 
Regulation 
15/2013 
Increased local content 
requirements in oil and 
natural gas industry. 
 
13/01/2014 MOI 
Regulation 
2/2014 
Public procurement 
restriction for foreign 
companies. 
Obligatory use of 
domestic products in 
government 
procurement. 
12/12/2013 MOT 
Regulation 
70/2013 
Local content 
requirements for 
traditional markets, 
modern stores, and 
shopping centres. 
 
14/10/2013 Government 
Regulation 
76/2014 
Local content 
requirements in defence 
industry. 
 
24/11/2014 MOI 
Regulation 
80/2014 
Local content 
requirements in 
automotive industry. 
To be conducted in 
Indonesia: welding, 
paintings, assembling 
of the motorised 
vehicles, and quality 
control. 
Notes: MOT, MOF, MOI, MOEMR are Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Industry, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Source: GTA, accessed 13 May 2015. 
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APPENDIX 4. SELECTED LIST OF EXPORT 
MEASURES TAKEN BY INDONESIA SINCE 2009 
Date of 
issuance 
Name Nature of restriction Notes/highlights 
31/12/2009 MOEMR 
Regulation 
34/2009 
Revitalisation program for 
small and medium 
enterprises in textiles and 
leather. 
 
6/05/2012 MOEMR 
Regulation 
7/2012 
Export ban on 14 mineral 
ores. 
 
16/05/2012 MOF 
Regulation 
75/2012 
Additional export tax on 
palm oil, cocoa beans, 
wood, and leather products. 
 
18/05/2012 MOF 
Regulation 
29/2012 
Export tax of up to 40 per 
cent on 65 products, 
including the 14 mineral 
ores previously banned and 
an additional 51 products. 
Intended to promote the 
production and export of 
'high value' finished goods 
instead of export of raw 
materials. 
22/10/2012 MOT 
Regulation 
65/2012 
Restriction on export of 
timber products. 
 
23/01/2013 MOT 
Regulation 
4/2013 
Increased export duty and 
reference price for crude 
palm oil and decreased 
reference price for cocoa 
beans. 
 
24/06/2013 MOT 
Regulation 
29/2013 
Technical restriction for 
export of crude palm oil. 
 
12/12/2013 MOT 
Regulation 
73/2013 
Revised export cap list for 
fertiliser. 
 
11/01/2014 MOF 
Regulation 
6/2014 
Increased export tax for 
certain mineral ores. 
Export tax for metal 
concentrates to increase 
gradually until 2016. 
28/03/2014 MOT 
Regulation 
19/2014 
Import and export 
provisions of rice. 
 
25/07/2014 MOF 
Regulation 
153/2014 
Conditional export tax 
exemptions for unrefined 
mineral exports. 
Gradual cut of tariff in line 
with progress in smelter 
building. 
15/07/2014 MOT 
Regulation 
39/2014 
Required registration for 
coal exporters. 
 
24/07/2014 MOT 
Regulation 
44/2014 
Technical restriction for tin 
exports. 
 
24/12/2014 MOT 
Regulation 
97/2014 
Licensing requirements for 
exports of industrial forestry 
products. 
 
Notes: MOT, MOF, MOEMR are Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resources. Source: GTA, accessed 13 May 2015. 
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dumping measures, and measures to overcome import surges. While these are 
important measures to be implemented by the Ministry of Trade and are in fact in 
line with WTO, their effectiveness lies in the capacity of the Anti-Dumping 
Committee. 
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